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GWADAR IS
INTENDED TO BE
THE CORNERSTONE
OF AN ATTEMPT
TO FORGE
A NEW STRATEGIC
TRIANGLE BETWEEN
OF PAKISTAN,
CHINA AND IRAN
DR. SIEGFRIED O.
WOLF
MD. MEHEDI HASAN
nstitute of Modern
Languages (IML),NSU,on
February 13, 2013,
arranged a workshop on
“WrittenCorrectiveFeedback
(CF)” as a part of IML’s
sequential lecture series
“Discourse Analysis II”
organized every month
throughout the year. The
speaker of this event was
Khaled Karim, a Ph.D.
candidate (ABD) in Applied
Linguistics at University of
Victoria in Canada. He is also
a lecturer of the Department
ofEnglishatNSUandnowon
study leave. The objective of
his lecturewas to increase the
awarenessof the effectiveuse
of CFin L2writing among the
student teachers (i.e.,
Linguistics and TESOL
students). At the very
beginning of the workshop
ProfessorMShahedulHaque,
Head of the Institute of
Modern Languages (IML),
made an enthralling speech
tomake theconcept clear and
to expose the various aspects
of corrective feedbackamong
the participating students. A
good number of English
Department studentswhoare
doing their major in
Linguistics and TESOL
attended the event.
DEFINITION OF
CORRECTIVE FEEDBACK
As statedbyKhaledKarim,
various termshavebeenused
in identifying errors and
providing feedback. Some of
the most frequently used
termsarecorrective feedback,
negative evidence, negative
feedback, and treatment of
error. Saying‘no, your spelling
is incorrect’ is an example of
negativeevidence.Hequoted,
according to Lightbown and
Spada (1999), “Corrective
feedback is an indication to
the learners thathisorheruse
of the target language is
incorrect”.
TYPES OF WRITTEN
CORRECTIVE FEEDBACK
There are two major types
ofwrittencorrective feedback:
Direct and Indirect.According
to Karim direct feedback
occurs when a teacher
provides the correct form of
every piece of error in
students’writing.Ontheother
hand, underlining or using
codes isanexampleof indirect
feedback..
There are four other types
of feedback to correct
linguistic errors in students’
written work: Metalinguistic
CF, Focused and Unfocused
CF, Electronic Feedback and
Reformulation. Firstly,
metalinguistic feedback refers
to giving brief grammatical
descriptions for each
numberederror. For instance,
“Don’t forget tomake theverb
agree with subject” is a
metalinguistic corrective
feedback. Secondly, focused
CF is based on a single
grammatical error; for
example,providingCFononly
preposition errors in the
paper. On the other hand,
unfocused CF deals with
correction on all or most
errors. Thirdly, electronic
feedback is a new form of
feedback inwhich the teacher
indicates an error and
provides a hyperlink to
concordance file thatprovides
examples of correct usage.
Finally, reformulation is
rewriting a paper to make it
as native like as possible.
THE DEBATE OVER THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CF
For many years there is a
debate over the usefulness of
CF. Karim pointed out that
according to Truscott (1966)
“Students do not improve in
writing no matter howmuch
feedback L2 students have
been provided with”. While
talking to several teachers
around the world as well as
some teachers at NSU, he
foundthat insomecases these
are true.
But he argued that it
dependsonseveral factors like
students’ level, their attitudes
toward error correction, the
type of errors etc. Karim
mentioned that according to
Ferris(1999), “It is important
to know what sort of error
correctionwearediscussing.”
KhaledKarimagreed that the
kind of feedback which is
proved ineffective for some
students might be proved
effective for other students.
On the question of which
type of feedback is more
effective he commented that
researchers have
disagreement over the effec-
tiveness of direct vs. indirect
feedback. Somestudies found
that indirect and metalin-
guistic feedback is more
effective thandirect feedback
while some found direct
feedback as more effective.
But here he emphasized on
the level of the student on
which we can deduce either
direct or indirect feedback
works better.
Khaled Karim concluded
by putting enormous impor-
tance on more research on
corrective feedback and
asserted that although
research has not yet
confirmed what type of FB is
moreeffective,moreevidence
is there about the usefulness
of FB. He pointed out that
teachers simply cannot stop
providing CF, but while
providingCF,we should keep
inmind thatdifferent typesof
errors may need different
types of feedback; students’
written proficiency in the
target language needs to be
taken into account; students’
attitudes towards errors and
their corrections need to be
identifiedandconsidered;and
students need to understand
thenecessity and importance
to improve their accuracy as
well asmotivated to attend to
teacher feedback.
Though his presentation
took a short period of time, it
will remain vivid in the
students’ memory.
Throughout the vibrant
lecture Karim’s spontaneous
interaction with the enthusi-
astic students sowedtheseeds
of future nationbuilderswho
will care about the students’
needs and try to provide
corrective feedbackeffectively.
The author is Information
Assistant, IML, NSU
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Gwadar Port – A potential
game changer?
wadarisnowapotential
hub for trade and
commerceintheregion’.
Withthesewords,PresidentAsifAli
ZardariexpressedPakistan’shopes
to turn the Sino-Pakistani project
intoanationalandregionalgateway
thatwillboost thecountry’s feeble
economy.GiventhefactthatBeijing
istheprincipalfinancialsponsorof
the port and that -since January
2013-it ismanagedby aChinese
company, Islamabadexpects that
Gwadarwill give new impetus to
China-Pakistan relations.The fact
thatGwadar is locatedoutsidethe
StraitofHormuznearsomeof the
world’s busiest shipping routes
supports Zardari’s statement.
However,thisisonlypartofthestory.
First of all, when taking into
consideration the numerous
unfavourable determinants for
the Gwadar’s project, many
analysts remain sceptical that
anyone will be able to turn the
project into an economically
viableendeavour.Forexample,
the endemic poverty of the
surrounding province of
Balochistan, increasing
opposition by large sections of
the Baloch people, political
instability,deterioratingsecurity
situation, and lack of infra-
structureandconnectivitywith
the hinterland all cast a dark
shadow on the fortune of
Gwadar. Hence, there is an
imminent threat that this
expensivemegaprojectwillhave
no economic value. In brief,
fromaneconomicpointofview
Gwadar looks like a ‘white
elephant’ which just came out
of theblue in,quite literally, the
middleofnowhere.Havingthis
in mind one should raise the
legitimate question: what are
the real intensions of Pakistan
and China behind the Gwadar
project? Are they motivated by
economicorratherbyamilitary
interests? Is itpartofa longterm
strategyofChinesepreparation
for a potential new ColdWar-
scenario between Beijing and
Washington in the Asia-Pacific
region? To tackle this puzzle,
observersareemphasizingthat
one should draw the attention
more towards the strategic and
security aspects of Gwadar.
FromaPakistaniperspective,
theobjectivebehindGwadar is
ostensiblybeyondtheeconomic
argument.Beingabrainchildof
the Pakistani Armed Forces,
naturally the port should serve
more than commercial
purposes only. Gwadar is
envisionedastheregionaltrans-
shipment hub for energy,
services and cargo between
Afghanistan, the Central Asian
Republics (CAR),Chinaandthe
Gulf.However,giventhefactthat
Afghanistan and the CAR are
increasingly linked with Iran’s
Chabahar port (through the
supportofIndia)theimportance
of Gwadar as a regional trans-
shipment hub is significantly
reduced.Butinsecurity,military
and strategic terms, the port
remains of tremendous signifi-
cance. First it can serve as a
listening post tomonitor –and,
if necessary, to disturb- one of
themostimportantsealanesfor
globallytradedoil.Thepotential
threat of energy security has
severe political and strategic
implicationsespeciallyforAsian
economies like India, Japan,
Vietnamor Philippines among
otherswhichareinconflictwith
Chinaover resources and terri-
tories. In other words, some
strategists inPakistanmight be
intrigued by usingGwadar as a
political asset to improve its
bargainingpowerinthecontext
of other regional conflicts,
namely Kashmir or water
disputes.
Second, in case of an armed
confrontation with India,
Gwadar is in a much better
geostrategic location than
Karachi’s Port. Therefore,
Gwadar would reduce the
dependence of Pakistan’s Navy
on the much more vulnerable
ports in Karachi. There are
indicationsthat theNavyhas its
very own interests regarding
Gwadar,especially inupgrading
theportwithnaval facilities.By
failingtohandover land(which
belongs to the Navy) that was
necessary for theestablishment
of a special economic zone at
theport, theventurewassignif-
icanthampered.Consequently,
Singapore's PSA International,
thecompanywhichwasrespon-
sible formanaging theGwadar
portprojectbeforetheauthority
was handedover toChina,was
forcedtogiveupbythePakistani
authorities.Withoutadoubt, the
Chinese were more appealing
for Pakistan as a partner than
the Singaporese, which, unlike
theirChinesecounterparts,were
interested in the port from a
purely economic perspective.
Third, it seems that Gwadar
is intended to be the corner-
stone of an attempt to forge a
new strategic triangle between
of Pakistan, China and Iran.
Islamabad’s trilateralambitions
aredrivenbyTehran’s intentions
to build a refinery and the
recently signed Iran-Pakistan
pipeline which would subse-
quently serve China’s energy
requirements. Besides the
economic interests, thebottom
lineforIran,BeijingandPakistan
is that all three states share
ambiguous relations, to say the
least, with the US and Indian
and aim to limit the influence
of New Delhi andWashington
as much as possible in South
AsiaandtheIndianOcean.And
last but not least, all three have
a keen interest to suppress the
Baloch national movement
which is challenging their
interests.
In order to understand the
complexityof theGwadar issue,
oneshouldalsoshedsomelight
on Chinese interests in this
project.Regardingofficialstate-
ments by Beijing, Gwadar is of
utmost importance for energy
security and trade. But unlike
Pakistan –which publicly
expresses its desire for a naval
base operated by the Chinese-
Beijing remains relatively quiet
regardingthe‘non-commercial’
dimensions of the strategically
well-located deep-seaport.
Consequently, analysts are
wonderingaboutBeijing’sinten-
sions inGwadar.Severalassess-
ments indicatethat theChinese
takeover of the port is not only
part of a long-run strategy to
secure itsenergyroutesbutalso
a tool to expand control over
maritime straits in the Indian
Ocean, especially the eminent
chokepoint in the Strait of
Hormuz.Around20per centof
the world’s oil and 60 per cent
ofChineseenergyrequirements
coming from the Middle East
have to transit this bottleneck.
Therefore Gwadar -connected
with Western China via the
Karakorum Highway- offers
China an alternative route via
Gwadar.BasicallyChinaisfacing
what has been called ‘the
Malaccadilemma’meaningit is
highly dependent on the
congested and narrow Strait of
MalaccabetweenMalaysiaand
Indonesia for its imports of
natural gas and oil shipments.
Incaseofaconflict, thisgateway
could be blocked easily. In this
context, one should mention
that theMalaccaStrait is under
virtual control ofWashington.
The US have permanently
stationed several fast Littoral
CombatShips inSingaporeand
the port of Singapore has facil-
ities specially designed for US
aircraft carriers.
Therefore, Gwadar is for
China much more than a
backup option for theMalacca
route.It’sanidealstagingground
for all kinds of maritime activ-
ities. Nevertheless, China has
demonstrated restraint
regarding any further
engagementinGwadar,besides
providingmostof thenecessary
funds. However, this policy
seemstohavechangedsincethe
latest agreement in January
allowed Beijing’s to take over
controlof theport thisyear.The
‘rediscovery’ of China’s enthu-
siasmregardingthecommercial
build-upisgenerallyunderstood
in the context of military and
strategicconsiderations.Taking
the growing influence of China
in Pakistan and the ‘new
strategic depth’ in the relation
between both countries into
account, it will be absolutely
certainthatIslamabadwillgrant
basing rights for the Chinese
Navy if Beijingwere interested.
This would grant China for the
first timethepossibility tousea
port in the IndianOcean for its
ships and submarines.
Furthermore, the option for
regularrefueling,refurbishment
and repair and other services
available,wouldallowChina to
exerciseextensiveseacontrol in
thearea.Thisdoesnotonlyserve
the purpose of protecting the
increasing volume of Chinese
nautical mileage in the region
but should also be interpreted
as a response to India’s blue-
water navy build-up and the
presenceofUSmaritimeforces.
Therefore, Gwadar under
Chinese control has the
potential to functionasa‘game
changer’.Until now,besides for
someperiodicnavalvisits,brief
exercises, and some military-
maritime cooperationwith the
Seychelles,Chinahadnooppor-
tunity tooperatewithwarships
into the Indian Ocean on a
permanent basis. In order to
bridge this gap of insufficient
capabilities regarding the
maneuverabilityandreachof its
vessels, China supports several
port constructions not only in
Pakistan but also in Sri Lanka
(Hambantota port) and in
ChittagongandSonadiya, near
Cox'sBazar.Additionally,China
is also wooing the Maldives to
gain more leverage. Of course,
officially all these projects are
supposed to push economic
developmentandcooperation.
However, since Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh have an interest in
maintaining cordial relations
with India, it is highly unlikely
that China will receive similar
offers regarding strategic-
militarycooperationliketheone
from Islamabad.With Gwadar
asapotentialnavalbase,China
willhaveaneffectivebridgehead
inoneof themostsensitiveand
important areas for global
energy security.With regards to
themassivebuild-upofChina’s
naval capabilities, it is unlikely
thatthefutureofGwadarwillbe
only a port reserved for
commercial ventures. As such
Gwadarwill serveasakeynode
and game changer when it
comes to reshaping the tradi-
tional power structure in
Southern Asian regarding the
controlovertheaccesstoenergy
and other natural resources.
Hence, it is important to point
out that while there is ample
reason to cooperate, China is
primarily doing so to push its
own strategic agenda.
First, China has more than
onceacted‘halfheartedly’when
Islamabad reached out for
support from it’s so called ‘all-
weather friend’. Taking the
persistent talkabout the‘thrust
factor’ in China-Pakistan
relations intoaccount, it seems
thatPakistan’spoliticaldecision-
makers have a very selective
memory when it comes to
incidences in which China
abandoned Pakistan. Just to
recall, China did not back up
Pakistanmilitarilyinits1965and
1971 wars with India. It even
turned its back diplomatically
on Pakistan during the Kargil
crisis of 1999 by supporting
Washington’s for Islamabad to
withdraw its troops from the
IndiansideoftheLineofControl
in Kashmir. The Chinese
position during this conflict
helped to improve its relations
with India which had turned
sour over a couple of issues,
including the 1962 border war,
several territorial disputes, and
issuesconcerningTibetandthe
Dalai Lama. Furthermore, by
adhering to strict neutrality in
the 2002 crisis between India
andPakistan,Beijingalso failed
to liveup to Islamabad’s expec-
tations. The statement that
China is a ‘friend of both
countries’,musthavecomeasa
major disappointment to the
Pakistanisecurityestablishment
at that time.
Second,theabovementioned
decisionscanalsobepartlyseen
as fortunate for South Asia and
beyond because it helped to
limit theconflicts to its regional
sphere. Nevertheless, the
Chinese did not do much to
prevent the region from these
wars -initiated by Pakistan- in
using its growing influence on
its ‘ally’. In contrast, by offering
militaryhardwareandtechnical
supplies it sent out the wrong
signals towards Islamabad
contributing to enthusiasm
about a potential success of
upcoming war efforts. In
contrast,boththe1965and1971
warsendedinnationaldisasters
forPakistanandincreasedinter-
national isolation.Furthermore,
it led to a systematic genocide
and countless war atrocities in
Bangladesh.TheroleofPakistani
security forcesduringthekilling
ofthreemillionBangladeshistill
remains to be adequately
clarified and legally addressed.
Obviously, Beijing’s strategic
thinkersat that timewereusing
China’s relations with Pakistan
as a proxy for maintaining the
high level of conflict in South
Asia in order to extend its own
influence at the expense of the
US and India.
Third, besides the India-
Pakistan conflict, also in
Afghanistan,China is following
its own strategy by doing
business through outbidding
non-Chineseprivatecompanies
whichcan’t competewith large
funded Chinese state enter-
prises. This will seriously
hamper the development of a
healthy Afghan economy in a
long term perspective. This is
gainingmoremomentum,since
China is not willing to get
involvedinasustainablerecon-
struction and reconciliation
process in the country, which
would not only serve
Afghanistanaswellasthewhole
region,butparticularlyPakistan.
Fourth, thefactthatPakistan’s
militaryisinwarwiththeTaliban
in the light of worsening US-
Pakistanrelations,whichmight
leadtoareductionofUSaid,will
make the economically weak
Pakistanistatemoredependent
on China. In this context, it is
significant to note that the
Chinesewerewillingtomaintain
a‘normalized’relationshipwith
the Taliban government in
Afghanistan between 1996 and
2001. In order to protect its
economic interests in the
Afghanistan-Pakistani region,
Beijing might be allured to
continuethisstrategyindealing
with Taliban and associated
extremist forces. Inotherwords,
when it comes to Chinese
support forcombatingmilitant
fundamentalism, there is
potential threat of another
disappointment for Pakistan’s
elites.
Fifth, related to the point
above, is the fact that China is
indirectly enhancing Islamic
fundamentalismandmilitancy
inPakistan.Facingsubnational
movements, militancy and
terrorisminterritoriesunder its
own control, Beijing should be
a‘naturalally’against terrorism
in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
However, it appears that the
Chinese prefer to benefit from
the US-led ‘war against terror’
by taking a ‘free-ride’. In other
words,whereWashingtondoes
notreceivemuch‘bangfortheir
bucks’ fromPakistan, Beijing is
ablewith thehelpof Islamabad
to reap the benefits of
Washington’sstabilizationefforts
by concentrating on the
economic exploitation of the
‘AfPak’region.Thisundoubtedly
emboldens the Taliban and
associated groups since it
indicatesthatthereisapowerful
neighbor who is willing to stay
moreorlessneutralwhichmight
offer some potential room to
maneuver in the future. This
viewgainsmoresignificance in
the light of Indio-Pakistani
relations. In order to contain
India’s influenceandhegemonic
aspirations in South Asia and
theIndianOceanregion,China
is fueling tensions between
Islamabad and New Delhi -a
modus operandi that plays
straightintothehandofreligious
extremists in Pakistan.
Toconclude, ifChinadecides
toturnGwadarintoanavalbase,
thiswillhavesevereimplications
on the security structure of the
Indian Ocean. At the moment,
there are indications that this
couldhappen.Hence, this step
definitelyredefinestherulesand
conditionsofa‘newgreatgame’
over influence in the whole
region. Nevertheless,
Islamabad’s decision-makers
haves to be aware of several
conditions in the gamble for
regional hegemony which will
be played out: first, its
asymmetric power relations
withBeijing;second, thatChina
is not always on the same
political and strategic page as
Pakistan; third, Pakistan is a
significant but not one of the
majorplayersinvolvedinChina’s
grand strategy; and fourth
Pakistan’s people and regions
like Baluchistan and Gilgit-
Baltistan have to pay the price
due to the Gwadar project.
Islamabad has to realize -even
if itmightbethemostimportant
Chineseally inSouthAsia- that
it is only one of many ‘junior
partners’ofChinainAsia.At the
end of the day, China’s aspired
strategic footprintmightbe too
big for Pakistani boots.
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